1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

ooo ably well the nature of the historical process, the drama of the perpetual dissensions and crises, and the very possibility of development.

181 If today, in exile, we ask this or that émigré of the rank and file
● 157 to describe the Russian character, we are sure to be offered two contrasting pictures. As often as not these different images correspond to the political camp of the émigré. To those of the Right and to those of the Left, Russia and the Russian show a different face.

Let us have a look at the left-wing image. This Russian is a lifelong seeker after truth, an enthusiast serving ideals with self-sacrificial ardor but frequently changing his gods and idols. He is utterly devoted to the people, to art, to ideas; eager to become a martyr for some noble cause; an irreconcilable foe of dishonesty, of compromise. An extremist in his dedication to ideas, he lives in the clouds and is estranged from reality—rootless, yet a saint in the full meaning of the word, a saint above material interests. Of the four elements, he is closest to fire and most alien to the earth—and yet he wishes to serve the earth, envisaging this service in terms of flame, conflagration, molten metal. In terms of religion, his is the eschatological type of Christianity—without a terrestrial home, but thirsting for the City of God. Or rather in search of a "New Heaven" and a "New Earth." He loathes nothing so much as moderation, regularity, the virtues of restraint and reasonableness, the smugness of a self-complacent culture. Culture, as the realm of consummate form, leaves him cold; he dreams of remolding all forms in his own crucible. The process of creation is more important to him than its product, the search for truth more important than truth itself, heroic death more important than a life full of labor. Usually he regards Belinsky as his ancestor and (today!) Dostoevsky as his supreme spokesman. It is not difficult to recognize in this image the self-portrait of the Russian intelligentsia,—not of the Russian educated class as a whole, but of that "order" whose origin goes back to the eighteen thirties.

18 However, the intelligentsia, this latest layer of Russian culture, is
517 not entirely lacking in national roots—or, more exactly, counterparts. For here we have to do not with the direct influence of deep popular forces but with the obscure subconscious play of the folk-soul, which in the destiny of these pseudo-renegades of nation and country repeats the features of another type, deeply embedded in the national psyche. Apostates, runaways, seekers, pilgrims—are

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

181 517 was prevalent a specific Russian-Jewish atmosphere, of which a Jewish poet has said: "Blessed he who ever breathed that air."

000 And yet, only a foreigner may be forgiven for not distinguishing between Slavic and Semitic features in the amalgam of the intellectual-sectarian type. Surely there was nothing Jewish in Belinsky; and when Tolstoy spoke of Dostoevsky's Jewishness, he meant it, of course, in the widest metaphorical sense. The difference is subtle but plainly perceptible—rather one of style, of aesthetic pattern, than of ethical contents—which, after all, is true of most national distinctions. The kinship between the intelligentsia and popular sectarianism, on the other hand, is a primary phenomenon, sufficient in itself to establish this type of intellectual as one of the historical formations of the Russian soul.

181 ●157 I believe that many, and not only among the right-wingers, will refuse to acknowledge the intelligentsia as the deepest manifestation of Russianness. To myself, whenever today, in exile, I try to conjure up a pure image of the Russian, he presents himself under a different aspect. Profound calm, taciturnity, on the surface even apathy. An organic aversion for anything high-flown, high-strung, extravagant. Simplicity often carried so far as to shun a word, a gesture too much. "Silence is golden." Serene, self-confident power. The silence reflects profound Oriental experience absorbed in the blood. Hence a strain of fatalism. Hence also the humor—the tolerant smile at the foreground of life, at the ceaseless fretting and fussing of the intellect. Humor and restraint are features this type of Russian shares with the Anglo-Saxon. In the opinion of some, by the way, only the Russians and the English possess a genuine sense of humor. Tolstoy and his set—the "high society" of Anna Karenina—in all of Europe felt most at home in the Anglo-Saxon world, the only one they respected. However, this superficial similarity covers a vastly divergent experience—Western activism and Oriental fatalism; but in both worlds the violence of elemental forces was tamed by centuries-old discipline.

I shall not attempt here to define the moral aspect of this type of Russian. I believe that, as a rule, one should avoid over-precise moral characterizations of national types. The good and the wicked, the vicious and the pure are found among all of them, probably in the same proportion. What matters are the shades of goodness, of purity etc., the "how" and not the "what,"—which means definitions rather in aesthetic (in the widest sense) terms. Is the Russian kind? Quite often he is. When he is, his kindness combined with

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

his own peculiar quiet wisdom, produces one of the finest human types. How we long for it in our warped life, swayed as we are by all kinds of passions—and be it spiritual passions! But the Russian can be cruel too—this we know well by now—and not only in a brief flare-up of fury but in a smugly callous, ruthlessly selfish way. Most often he amazes us by a kind of Oriental indifference to the lot and the sufferings of others—coupled with gentleness and superficial compassion (Karataev!). There is something Chinese in the impassive attitude of the Russian peasant towards his own and his fellowmen's death. This kind of wisdom takes us beyond the limits of Christianity. Tolstoy was profoundly aware of the primeval, prehistoric roots of this indifference ("The Three Deaths").

Nor is it easy to generalize about the volitional nature of the Russian. Is he indolent or active? More often than not he appears lazy; he works under pressure, pulling himself together only at the very last; but then he does not spare himself and is capable of making up in a few days for months of idleness. But there are also Russians of dogged industry, performing their tasks with restrained but intense passion; such were to be found among kulaks, inventors, scientists, even administrators. The amorphous mass of the people readily submits to the leadership of this sturdy élite, while seldom respecting it. Without this ruthless and strong-willed type the creation of the Empire, and even of the Muscovite state, would have been unthinkable.

In mentioning the Muscovite state, we are offering a clue to the understanding of this second brand of Russian. Its embodiment is the Muscovite, as his hard historical destinies have shaped him. For two or three centuries rough hands had been at work kneading the Slavic dough, knocking, bruising, breaking in the recalcitrant stuff, molding it into an extremely tenacious form. The Petrine Empire overlaid the Muscovite tsardom with a varnish of European culture, but it was still the Muscovite type that remained the real mainstay. To this type belong all those classes that were little touched by the Petersburg culture. All the clergy, the merchant class, the thrifty part of the peasantry (insofar as it was not undermined by spiritual restlessness). We meet this type again in the great Russian literature, where it is, however, pushed into the background by later spiritual formations. It is reflected most vividly in the regional literature—the writings of Aksakov, Leskov, Melnikov, Mamin-Sibiriak. And Tolstoy, of course. Although he cannot be fitted altogether into the Muscovite mold, he stemmed from it, had a

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

deep fondness for this type, and was apt to idealize it. Karataev, Kutuzov, Levin are Muscovites; and so are Captain Mironov and Maxim Maximovich—Muscovite state servants who have survived the Petrine upheaval. The plodding official under Nicholas I, so ill-treated by the satirical literature of the time, represents the last layer of the Muscovite formation. We meet this type also on the highest cultural level: Pososhkov, Bolotov, the Aksakovs, Zabelin, Kliuchevsky—all these are authentic Muscovites. Here is the source of Russian creative power—which, however, like all things ultra-national, is rather limited in outlook. The narrow-mindedness of Tolstoy and Mussorgsky can assume truly tragical forms.

Such are the two polar types of Russianness, to whose conflict the high drama of the nineteenth century is largely due. They may be regarded as the expression of the basic dualism inherent in the Russian soul. They are, however, only the latest historically conditioned manifestations of this duality. Of all the successive cultural layers of the Russian soul, they represent the Muscovite stratum and that latest formation, the intelligentsia, born in the eighteen-thirties. But the historical approach to the problem of the Russian character makes it imperative to look beyond the limits of this duality. Between Muscovy and the intelligentsia there lies the Empire. Nor did Russia begin with Muscovy. What remains today of the Russian of the Empire, the Russian of the Kievan era, of Novgorod?

When, basing our claim on Pushkin, we assert with Dostoevsky that the Russian is a universalist, and that in this lies his national mission, it is actually the imperial Russian we have in mind. Universality is characteristic neither of the Muscovite nor of a true representative of the intelligentsia. On the contrary, the distinctive feature of both is narrow-mindedness, sectarianism. The Petrine reform, however, had brought Russia out into the open spaces of the world, had placed her at the crossroads of all the great Western civilizations and had brought into being the species of the Russian-European. His main attribute is freedom and openness of mind—such as to set him apart not only from the Muscovite but also from the European of the West. European culture, taken as a whole, was more intensely alive on the banks of the Neva or Moskva than on those of the Seine, the Thames, or the Spree. It is this imperial upper-class stratum that has given rise to the myth of the Russian's peculiar gift for foreign languages. Actually the average Russian,

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

whether Muscovite or of the intelligentsia, is totally devoid of linguistic ability and finds it hard to adjust himself to strange countries and alien surroundings. But the Russian-European felt at home everywhere.

Throughout the two centuries of his existence, we have known him in two incarnations: the wanderer and the builder. Weak natures were easily crushed by the wealth of the alien culture. The conflict between the traditional Russian values and those of the new Westernized life was apt to generate skepticism, shallowness and premature weariness. Beginning with the "petits-maîtres" of the eighteenth century, "whose hearts belonged to the French Crown," a long chain of so-called "superflous people," including the Onegins, Rudins, Raiskys, stretches across Russian literature. Not so long ago it was customary to regard this as the basic trend of Russian life. This is a stupendous misunderstanding, a historical-literary aberration. We are well acquainted with another type of Russian-European—one that had retained the strong will of the Muscovite, his bond with the motherland, and sometimes even his religious faith. It was men like these who built the Empire, who fought its wars and made its laws, who sowed the seeds of enlightenment. Such were "the fledglings of Peter's nest," although in fairness it must be admitted that this type had come into being before Peter's time. Its genealogy begins with the Boyar Matveev, with Ordyn-Nashchokin, maybe even with Kurbsky. They reached their culminating point in the era of Alexander I. Under him they occupied the highest government posts. There was no rift yet between government and culture. Pushkin, "the bard of Empire and of freedom," was the last great embodiment of that imperial type. It did not, however, completely disappear even after the break between monarchy and culture under Nicholas I. In the "Era of the Great Reforms" the "Russian-Europeans" for a time came again into their own. We saw "the last Mohicans" of the type ourselves in the Senate and the Imperial Council under the last two tsars; deprived of power and influence, they still retained their rich experience, their political wisdom, alas! no longer needed by the degenerate dynasty. But on a lower level, within the administration, the courts, the liberal professions, the local self-government, and, of course, the universities, it was largely the "Europeans" who carried on their shoulders the whole burden of cultural activities under excruciatingly difficult conditions. Nearly always they shunned politics in order to concentrate on the only tasks open to them.

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

181 Hence their lack of popularity in a country that for generations had
●157 been breathing the exhalations of civil war. Nevertheless, in every city, every district, these zealots of culture left some achievement behind them—here a school, there a learned society, a model farm, or just the memory of a dedicated physician, a humane judge, a noble man. It was they who preserved Russia from stagnating and freezing up at a time when every effort was made from above to put her on ice, and from below to set her aflame. While the Muscovite formed the backbone of Russia, the Russian-European was her builder. However, as we have pointed out, this creative, constructive type derived itself from Muscovite roots. While his lifework often compelled the "European" to wage a tenacious fight against the Muscovite's inertia and indolence, he yet shared with the latter a common moral ideal, a common love of Russia and her "soul." Kliuchevsky's history and Russian music were his link with Moscow. Whenever this link crumbled away, he would become a rolling-stone, no longer capable of constructive work. Under certain circumstances he might turn into an "intellectual"; this is the upper-class source of the intelligentsia, quite distinct from its democratic springs. But so long as he stood at his post, performing some vital task, he remained loyal to Russia and to the Muscovite principle of service. In the beginning of the twentieth century, notably after the revolution of 1905, the creative Russian-European element showed signs of impetuous growth at the expense of the intelligentsia. It looked as if the future belonged to it. . . . Fate decided differently.

181 What features of the Russian may be traced to the early Russia of warring principalities and free city-republics? Fully aware that we are embarking upon arbitrary and even fantastic speculations, we yet venture an answer: that aspect of the Russian character usually called its "largeness"; its unruliness; its rebelliousness—neither ideological nor sectarian—but rooted in a deep organic aversion to any kind of rigid form. Even today, the Russian heart still responds to the ancient chronicles, to the "Lay of Prince Igor." To state it boldly: it is not the stern builders of Empire, and not the statesmen, who most strongly appeal to Russian national emotions, but the knightly princes, the dare-devil Mstislavs, the Viking Sviatoslav, the tumultuous freedom of Novgorod. Muscovy certainly never succeeded in wholly disciplining the Slavic unruliness. It erupted in the free Cossack communities, in the sporadic uprisings; in the nineteenth century it found an outlet in debauchery and high living, in fantastic dissipation, in the bohemianism and

l: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

artistic trend of the Russian character. This side of the Russian soul finds a most adequate expression in the gipsy song and dance. Russian debauchery is often somber and heavy, an effect, maybe, of Tartar blood and Muscovite oppression; but it can also be gay, generous, magnanimous. Such were the revelries of Pushkin, who combined Europeanism with Russian reckless freedom. Many talented Russians have succumbed to their nature (A. Grigoriev); and yet this characteristic, so long as it is to some extent held in check by self-discipline and education, is inseparable from Russian genius. "How fond I am of drunks!" Tolstoy once inadvertently confessed.

Gloom and childlike gaiety are the two poles of Russian unruliness. In the mood of youthful light-heartedness, generosity, sparkling high spirits, the Russian character is at its most attractive. This gaiety, however, is ephemeral. Unaccountable joy does not satisfy the Russian for long. He is likely to come to a grim and tragic end. If he fails to settle down in time (Muscovite fashion), his end is a ruined life, or a monk's hood.

Is it possible to penetrate still deeper into the Russian soul—beyond Kiev and Novgorod, beyond the threshold of history? If we remove, like skin after skin from a bulb, the successive cultural layers deposited by history, shall we find in the Russian a central irreducible core? It may be that our question is not posed correctly. The national soul is not given in history. The ethnic psyche serves only as the raw material of history. That psyche, moreover, is not all of a piece: Slavs, Finns, Turks,—all have gone into the making of the Russian soul. A nation is not a tree or an animal whose potentialities are all enclosed in the seed. The nation is rather to be compared to a musical or poetical work whose first measures or lines do not necessarily convey the main theme. Sometimes this theme is not revealed until the very end. It may be that in this sense (as revelation of an idea) the nineteenth century was more truly national than Kiev or Muscovy. Without assuming in any way that Slavic paganism contained in embryo the idea of Russianness (how could we differentiate here between Eastern and Southern Slavs—between Russians and Bulgars or Serbs?)—we yet believe it worthwhile to peer into this mysterious depth. Better than other civilized peoples we have preserved the organic, pre-Christian foundations of the national soul. Deep at the root of the greatest masterpieces of Russian literature there is something akin to the primitivism of folklore. Tiutchev, Tolstoy, Rozanov have distilled, as it

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

181 were, in the apparatus of high spiritual pressure, the primordial stuff
● 157 of Russian paganism.

Where shall we look for a key to it? We cannot go here beyond a few suggestions, the first steps leading down into the subterranean galleries of the Russian soul. Some time ago W. W. Weidlé (*Sovremennye Zapiski*, No. 64) attempted, rightly so in my opinion, to link this Russian essence with the family principle. As late as the nineteenth century, the Russian-Slav was not yet wholly estranged from Mother-Earth. His intimate union with the world of nature makes individual existence difficult and strange. Nature for him is not landscape, not a background for his daily life, and still less, of course, an object of conquest. He is embedded in her as in the maternal womb; he responds to her with all his being; apart from her he dries up and cannot live. He has not realized yet the frightfulness of her ruthless beauty, the frightfulness of death—since there is nothing in him that can die. All that is valuable and lofty in the human being is generic, communal, indestructible. And that which is individual is not worth immortality. The moral law of the individual, his right to his own conscience, to self-determination—these things have no validity in face of the law of life. In the moral sphere this attitude leads to communal, collective ethics based on the principle of mutual responsibility. In art it generates an enormous power of sensuous perception and suggestion (derived from Gea, the Earth), which is offset by weakness of form and of individual creative design. In the pursuit of knowledge it leads, of course, to irrationalism and reliance on intuition. In work and social life it leads to distrust of all planning, system, organization. The Slavophile ideal, for all its consciously Christian character, is strongly imbued with this pagan element of the Slavic psyche. In the life of the common people, however, we find it already sublimated by the Church and, this has led to the widely held assumption that it forms the very essence of Eastern Christianity. Actually it has nothing to do with Christianity; rather it takes us far eastwards. Another step, and we are in India with her total obliteration of the individual.

The question arises: where in this historically stratified scheme of the Russian soul is its Christian, its Orthodox layer? The truth is that there is more than one such layer, since there are actually as many brands of Russian Christianity as there are historical types of the Russian, and maybe more. Just as every nation experiences Christianity in its own way, so every cultural stratum of a nation

l: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

has its own key to Christianity, or at least its own nuances of it. There is no need, however, to distinguish between fine shades of Christianity in the Russian soul; all the contradictions stand out with stark boldness. Just try to express in one formula the religiosity of St. Sergius and the Archpriest Avvakum, that of the Metropolitan Philaret and of Dostoevsky. For good measure, add to these Greek-Orthodox folklore and the religion of Tolstoy!

The opinion is widely held that the Russian people are set apart from other European peoples by the peculiar intensity of their religiosity. Actually this impression derives from the fact that the twentieth century finds Russia and the rest of Europe in different acts of the religious-historical drama. In Russia, among the great mass of the people, the Middle Ages lived on right down to the middle of the nineteenth century. The Europe of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries would offer a closer analogy to imperial Russia. But the collapse of Russian medievalism was stormy and destructive in the extreme. Today the attitude towards religion, both on the part of the masses and of the intelligentsia, is not markedly different from that in other European countries.

. . . And now let us turn to our basic problem: which historical layers of the Russian soul have been destroyed by the Revolution and which will survive it? The answer now should be clear. The extermination of the old educated class and the suppression of all the sources that fed it were bound to remove the two uppermost strata from the spiritual structure of Russian society. The man of Empire and the intellectual perished together with the "bourgeoisie," the upper layer of the old society. As to the imperial type, the Russian of universal culture, some relics of it still survive within the ranks of the "specialists." Some time ago, the [Soviet] government belatedly realized that the liquidation of the upper cultural stratum was doing irreparable harm to technical progress. The surviving old-timers became the object of special attention. However, they were valued only in their capacity of specialists in some narrow field; as has been wittily said, golden watches were used to drive in nails. Their broad culture, no longer needed by anyone and even offensive to the new ruling class, still subsists within some tiny groups or even families. The new educated class produces exclusively specialists who often lack the rudiments of a general culture, even plain literacy. On the other hand, never since the Muscovite tsardom has Russia been fenced off from Europe by such a high wall. This wall has been erected not only by censorship and

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

121 voke changes in the system of political relations (power structure) and hence in the social structure.

121 181 Two contrasting cultures, that of the power-seeking and self-oriented nomadic horsemen of the Eurasian steppes, and that of the anarchic and group-oriented tillers of the land in the river basins of eastern Europe, provide valuable data for an understanding of the formation of political elites in Russian society, and particularly for identification of conflicting orientations which have been at the root of its social instability and political aggression throughout ages of its growth. There were other sources of conditioning circumstances which have provided significant elements to the content of Russia's culture and its social structure and which have affected the recruitment of political elites and the formation of ideologies. Such were, for instance, the Byzantine system of the administration and of the Church-State relations, the conditions of serfdom and the retarded growth of middle classes, and Western European technology and political and social philosophies. There were also "external" pressures which—in conjunction with Russia's geographic location—have influenced its social and political development. Such, for instance, were the quality of Russia's soil and climate, the moving of the trade routes from the Dnieper valley toward the West in the late middle ages, the sudden growth and disintegration of the Mongol empire, the formation and the expansion of Western European and of Pacific imperial systems. A number of these agents, however, have tended to perpetuate the initial basic structure and to intensify the clash of views of life which was introduced into Russian society through the imposition of the rule of the steppe nomads over the tillers of the land in the ancient past.

• [157] One of the basic traits in the interpersonal and institutional relationships of the horse-breeders from the steppes consists of an apparent want of lasting emotional attachments, of social trust and of ties of moral unity. There is a lack of stability in loyalties and therefore a system of power which is self-oriented, that is, based on personal drives for aggrandizement. Only continuing conquests and lasting threats of common external enemies can assure the perpetuation of this predatory system

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

tion has provided moral and ideological foundations for the formation and the expansion of a globally oriented empire, while at the same time, it has also reinforced some of the elements in the structure of the Russian State which have been responsible for its explosiveness and instability.

In the Byzantine politico-religious system, the Church was not only a religious institution but also a political organization, and an arm of the political power. Byzantium therefore undertook to Christianize the Russian lands as a means of political penetration. Following Byzantine Church traditions and practices, the dominant native speech was adopted for Church services. Christianization therefore fostered also Slavization of these regions. Moreover, the Church of Byzantium carried with it the Byzantine concept of unity of Church and State, as well as that of a god-like monarchial power, with the mission to create a Universal Christian Empire.

The Eastern Church also sanctioned unlimited paternal authority and promoted protection-dependency relationships both on politico-administrative and on family levels. This Church sponsored unconditional obedience, attitudes of reverence and gratitude, and feelings of humility and self-effacement, fear and awe in the relations of man to his God, his Prince and his Father. According to the precepts of this Church-State philosophy, the authorities were held responsible for the well-being as well as for the failures and sins of their dependents. Thus the Byzantine Church was preparing psychological and ideological grounds for a politico-religious integration of Russian lands in a system of military theocracy, which became characterized by its Messianic ideology of world redemption and by its dominance-submission and protection-dependency relationships. But such a political system was in sharp conflict with the anarchic view of life and the equalitarian philosophy of family and community relations held by large sections of the population in that area.

This basic internal clash of ideologies in Russian society was intensified in the course of the following centuries when the pressure of the steppe nomads and of the expanding Western empires favored increased militarization, economic regimentation and centralization of total power in the hands of an auto-

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

175 642 cratic Czar. By the time of Ivan the Terrible, the power of the independent landed aristocracy was suppressed, and the autocratic power rested now on a service nobility who were given lands in conditional possession depending upon their service and their loyalty to the Czar. These people therefore found themselves in a slave-like dependency upon the ruler who was likened to God, a situation that promoted political and social regimentation and fostered domineering-subservience relationships, thus intensifying the existing incompatibilities between the upper and lower strata of the Czardom.

● [157] Domineering-subservience relationships are likely to breed humiliating experiences of self-abasement and feelings of wounded self-esteem which in turn might foster intense hostilities as well as compensatory ideas of grandeur. Thus in new circumstances, both self-seeking and power-orientation were reinforced in the upper strata, and manifested themselves in the oppressive rule of the nobility, in their extreme factionalism, and in their ruthless struggle for personal power and for the favors of the Czar.

[566] This trend of events, by the second part of the sixteenth century, led to establishment of serfdom and to direct interference of the service nobility and of the government in the communal and family relations of the peasantry. From this time on, the Church, the State and the landlords joined hands in strengthening the power of the Father and of the village elders and sponsoring in the peasant family and in the village community, dominance-submission relationships, absolute power and dependence, blind obedience and self-abnegation.

181 [579] The inevitable clash of this new power-oriented social philosophy with the old stateless and equalitarian values, was reflected in intense family and community tensions and in mass restlessness. Thus a weakening of power and of controls on any level—family, local, or national—opened the way to urges of destructive aggression and revolt against all the holders of power: the fathers, the village elders, the landlords, the Church and the Czar. Outbreaks of such extreme enmity were manifested in frequent communal riots, in mass vagrancy, in bloody revolutionary uprisings, and in widespread dissent from the official

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

therefore were leaving the land to move to the cities or to join the bandits as traders and warriors.

These bandit-warriors are pictured in the Russian folk epic as ruling by such terrifying violence and dreadful terror and craft that all the living beings on the earth flee and hide, or lie prostrate, and even the earth itself shrinks and the sun sinks away at their appearance:

> The red sun was sinking
> Behind the dark woods, behind the broad sea,
> Multitudes of stars studded the clear sky
> When Lord Volga Buslavlevich was born
> In holy Russia.
> When Volga Buslavlevich was five years of age,[27]
> Lord Volga Buslavlevich went forth over the damp earth
> Damp mother earth was rent,
> The wild beasts fled away up to the clouds;
> And the fish scattered in the blue sea:
> And Lord Volga Buslavlevich went
> To learn all craft and wisdom,
> All the various languages;[28]
>
> Volga grew in strength and stature.
> He chose for himself a bold druzhina,
> Of thirty youths save one,
> He, Volga making the thirtieth.
> His dear 'uncle' bestowed upon him,
> Gracious Vladimir of Royal Kiev,
> Three cities with their peasants.[29]

The hero knights of these legendary *Byliny* (the events of the olden days) when they find themselves in circumstances which appear to be under their control, are likely to be boastful, quarrelsome, disrespectful, sensitive to rank and inclined to belittle the strength of their adversaries. In such circumstances they spend their time either in plundering, fighting, maiming and killing, or in feasting, debauchery, and drunkenness.[30]

The extreme power-compulsion and delusions of grandeur of these supermen, as well as their complete lack of self-control, are well symbolized in folk narratives about Svyatogor. This hero has an irresistible urge to bring the heaven and the earth to-

G. Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

III

The atmosphere of despotism, servility, fear and awe which developed under this system of total regimentation and dependency left an imprint on the habits and the attitudes of the people and had some influence on the shaping of their values and of their views of life. In conditions of complete dependency and domineering-subservience relationships, self-concern, destructive aggressiveness, as well as fatalistic resignation, are likely to thrive, not personal and social responsibility, moral obligations or group solidarity.

This trend of events meant also increasing social restlessness and political instability which in turn favored the rise to leadership of ruthless power-seekers and psychopaths. Lack of limitation on the personal power of the Czar, dissensions among the nobility and want of responsibility and of emotional balance in the person of the Czar led often to extreme excesses in Czar's rule.[11] All the attempts of the boyars to transform the Boyarskaya Duma into a legislative body were unsuccessful. Since the end of the seventeenth century even the *Zemski Sabor*, the consultative body of representatives of all classes, ceased to be convoked.

Only when the throne became vacant and the omnipotent Czar was gone did this nobility sometimes attempt to squeeze out promises and pledges from the pretenders to the throne. But, even then the remnants of the old boyar class and the new service nobility clashed over the question of control. Hence as soon as the new monarch was installed he did not have any difficulty in establishing his unlimited control and in proceeding to rule arbitrarily in face of a divided dvorianstvo.

The Czar could do anything he pleased with the nobles, including personal chastisement. They were treated as minors by the Czar and trained in blind and unconditional obedience. In the Czar's presence they observed dead silence. Anything that came from his hand, even the most degrading treatment, was to be received with resignation or even regarded as a sign of distinction. At the same time, however, while the nobles were exposed to all kinds of threat, terror and indignities on the part

7 [i.e. Czardom by end of 17th century.. Analyst]

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

the favors of one's superiors that one hoped to exercise more power and to achieve a higher degree of security.

Such a situation often demanded self-abasing and cringing humility toward superiors in the hierarchy as an adjustment to a situation of permanent insecurity and threat. ". . . those employed believe that they can never do enough to show their zeal."[8] "Without being base, it is impossible to get on," the officials themselves would say.[9] At the same time, perhaps as a compensation for degradation and loss of self-respect, there developed the propensity of the officials to show haughtiness and arrogance to those below them in rank and status. "A man, as soon as he rises a grade above the common level, acquires the right . . . to maltreat his inferiors to whom it is his duty to transmit the blows that he receives from those above him."[10]

In such conditions preoccupation with one's self rather than interest in group ideals and objectives thrived. There was therefore a tendency for selfish and petty concerns, greediness, venality, and corruption. Careerism prevailed over loyalty. Fortunes were made by many in public service as a security for the uncertain future.[11] The public opinion itself supported such behavior because it was expected that people who acquire office or any other positions of trust would take personal advantage of the situation. In some departments because of the inadequacy of the salaries and in order to meet the expected high standards of living the officials were considered to have tacit permission to have recourse to illicit perquisites. Administration, justice, police, the army and the navy, and even the clergy, all had their acknowledged perquisites, which often included bribes.[12]

In such conditions in which extreme self-concern thrived, the Czar himself did not feel safe and secure. This sense of insecurity on the very peak of power was reflected, for instance, in the tendency of the Czars not to tolerate any outstanding personalities in their midst.[13] The same feeling was reflected in the idea that any concession on the part of the Czar would be considered as a sign of weakness. The result was that the Czar was often surrounded by sycophants and careerists and had no close friends whom he could trust and on whom he could rely for support at all times. In such circumstances the Czar might feel isolated,

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

643 imagine himself threatened by "enemies," and live in fear.[14] As
157 a defense against such feelings the Czar might be inclined to follow the advice of those of his officials who favored concentration of power and who advised against giving up any of his prerogatives or against any yielding to the demands of the opposition. "Constitution" to such a Czar and his camarilla was as dangerous as "revolution."

But such policies, which are rooted in a sense of extreme insecurity themselves tend to strengthen such feelings. Mistrust of people, fear of the "enemies," suppression of all opposition and tendency to concentrate increasingly the power in one's hands, to dominate and to demand absolute submissiveness is therefore perpetuated. Hence, power-relations in Russia of the eighteenth and nineteenth century tended to follow the pattern of rule established earlier in Muscovite Czardom:

661 The emperor Nicholas I ruled his country like a gamekeeper. Under
643 his administration of the empire, based as it was upon a system
566 of flogging, imprisonment, and exile to Siberia, the great could indulge their caprices with impunity . . . But . . . in reality . . . the masters were also slaves. Every man, whoever he might be, was dependent on someone more powerful than himself who could with impunity make him wretched, and over him again there was someone still mightier. The lord, it is true, lived in comfort, and the serfs in squalor, but that was all. They were all slaves, one as much as the other . . . I have seen both oppressors and oppressed at close quarters, and I can aver that the inhuman regime of bondage corrupted and depraved one as much as the other.[15]

625 Just as in the political organization of steppe nomads and in the Muscovite Czardom such relations of insecurity, mistrust, self-seeking, abusive domineering and blind subordination demanded an efficient system of watchfulness, vigilance, checking and counterchecking. A special attention therefore had to be paid to the institution of secret political police. Since the days of Czar Nicholas I, the secret political police, known as the Third Section, was placed above all ministries, and was directly subject to the Emperor himself, just as in the days of Ivan the Terrible. Like the Oprichniki of Ivan the Terrible the Third Section was the main agency of vigilance, the chief watchdog of the state. It

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

and was expected to love his family, he was to remain detached and distant. Such paternal behavior was particularly noticeable in the urban strata where both the Turco-Mongol and the Church influences were stronger. "Do not smile at him, do not play with him" is the advice of the Domostroy concerning father-son relations.[28] The father was not supposed to show any outward signs of emotion, neither anger nor affection toward his wife, children, or his servants. Even during the beating the father was expected to remain cold and detached, according to the Domostroy. His love was to be of a charitable and compassionate character. Any kind of personal closeness and familiarity with his wife or children might have undermined an authority that was based on sternness, fear and awe.

A number of autobiographies and other writings of Russian men of letters, as well as the accounts given by foreign observers, stress this duality in the behavior of the father. He is pictured as compassionate, kind and goodhearted, but also as detached, harsh and abusive.[29] A number of these documents tell about the *groza* (terror) in which the father or the grandfather had held all his dependents; about his detachment even when playing with children, and about his inability to be with them on comradely terms or to laugh with them. They often tell about the difficulties the children experienced in attempting to approach their father on intimate and friendly terms, though they felt that he had a "good heart" and was "compassionate":

My father, true to the family tradition, took up the profession of soldiering . . . To his children he was a comparative stranger but we were terrified of him. We only saw him at meals; he spent the rest of his time in his private rooms which none of us dared to enter save at his command. A masterful, violent nature, he either could not or would not control his temper, and was an object of terror to us and to his servants. However, he had a good heart. But at the period when he lived, harshness had become a moral principle. To show benevolence was to be weak, to be cruel was to be strong . . . and my father, like most men, was cast in the mould of his period. He carefully concealed his feelings under a mask of harshness. He was certainly brutal; he was also compassionate in his own way . . . At this period children, the poor and the weak, and still more the serfs, were scarcely considered to possess a soul. My father reigned, but did not govern.

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

Like Jupiter, he only interfered in the affairs of mortals in moments of crisis. But when he did interfere it was no laughing matter, and everybody, from cellar to attic, trembled in his shoes . . .[80]

This God-like, unapproachable, inscrutable, absolute and arbitrary power of a stern and violent but also benevolent, compassionate and solicitous father was apparently projected into the Russian supernatural world in the form of the *Domovoy*, the house spirit. According to the Great-Russian folk beliefs, the Domovoy was the protector of the house; he had patriarchal prerogatives over it, but also depended upon it. He demanded from the family all kinds of honors. At the same time he was as unpredictable in his behavior as any stereotyped family head in the Great-Russian patriarchal family system.

Thus the Domovoy was at times protective, benevolent and compassionate, but at other times he would become wicked, vindictive and mischievous. He was endowed with supernatural powers and could bring either fortune or calamity upon the family, depending upon his frequently changing moods and dispositions. It was, therefore, considered wise to address him as "Grand Father" and to propitiate and appease him by frequent offerings in viands. If such attention were shown to him he was likely to be helpful. But if he were neglected, he would become enraged and full of wrathful vengeance. In such a case, he could be atoned only by blood; the corners of the izba were sprinkled with blood of a cock that was killed for the occasion and various incantations were uttered.[81]

8
FAMILY CONFLICTS

I

THE FATHER treated his family members as wards and minors because he was responsible for their well-being, their behavior and their salvation. He had to show a constant solicitude for them (*neustannaya zabota*). The blame for their

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

These attitudes implied complete dependency and self-abnegation on the part of the wife and children in relation to their master. The wife and the children were expected always to speak with respect to the father, that is, in the second person plural instead of the second person singular—the way the children addressed each other or their mother. The wife did not address her husband by his first name, but by his first and second name (patronymic) which was the way less intimate acquaintances addressed each other. The children had to demonstrate their thankfulness for the father's care and solicitude by kissing his hands. Before a bride left her parental home, custom demanded that she say to her father, "God will help you for bread and salt." And he would advise her to be obedient to her new relations: "Be obedient to them the way you were obedient to me" (*slushay kak menia slushala*).[7]

Emphasis on fear and awe, obedience and gratitude was very outstanding in the Great-Russian patriarchal family relations. These feelings and attitudes had a supernatural sanction. As a result of the teachings of the Russian Orthodox Church, it was considered in popular opinion that any disobedience or disrespect of the father's will was mercilessly punished by God who brought life-long misery and misfortune for such unfilial behavior. Even after death, the soul of a disobedient and ungrateful child could hardly escape punishment in the eternal fire of hell. Many Great-Russian folktales place a great emphasis on obedience and gratitude and stress the cruel penalty and fearful fate that awaited a disobedient and ungrateful son.[8]

Such family relations in which demands of a harsh and detached, and even capricious and arbitrary father had to be answered by humility, unconditional submission, blind obedience, love and gratitude; in which family members fought over priorities and rights; where all felt dependent upon one another and isolated from the rest of the world, could not fail to provoke tensions and cause intense family antagonisms and animosities. Such tensions and conflicts became characteristic of the Great-Russian patriarchal family and were manifested in the relations between husband and wife, father and sons, between the siblings and between the in-laws.[9]

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia / RF1

593
578

The family was divided into two clans, the elder and the younger. The elder ones were proud, rich, all powerful, fearing none but Jupiter [father]. They had fine rooms where they could run about and play without fear of colliding with the furniture; they lived in style and despised us, and punished us. The youngsters were weak and oppressed, with only a little room as their domain; they were kept running errands and had sweets to eat only on the rare occasion when they were given a few. They were teased and were accused of lying when they were not telling lies; . . . They had none to defend them against the iniquity of the elders . . . The two clans carried on constant warfare. The elders . . . would treat the youngsters as vassals and make fun of them.[20]

In the homes of merchants and petty officials, frictions, tensions, and animosities were so outstanding a feature of family life as late as the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, that they formed a recurrent theme in Russian belles-lettres of those days, such as in the works of Dostoyevsky and of Ostrovsky. N. Dobrolyubov, a noted Russian critic, commenting on the writings of Ostrovsky, asserted that it was the system of tyranny which caused cunning, hatred, lack of justice and of human dignity in the family.[21] In a similar way Peter Kropotkin, observing family relations in various strata of Russian society in the second part of the nineteenth century, claimed that, "quite a network of habits and customs of domestic slavery, of utter disregard of human individuality, of despotism on the part of the fathers, and of hypocritical submission on that of the wives, the sons, and the daughters, had developed."[22]

[157]

9

MOTHER-CHILD ATTACHMENT

I

THOUGH the internal situation in the Great-Russian patriarchal family tended to be rather tense, the role played by the mother was likely to introduce into that family an element of moderation and emotional integration.

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF: Great Russia RF:

Aware of such attitudes and practices and sometimes also moved by a genuine sense of guilt, many of the accused were ready to confess and to incriminate themselves. Hense self-accusatory confessions became common to all strata of Russian society, including the intelligentsia. Thus, for instance, when the Russian anarchist leader Bakunin had been extradited to the Czarist police he wrote a *Confession to the Czar* full of extreme self-recriminations. In his confession this leading Russian conspiritor and revolutionary said that he merited the sternest penalties known to Russian law because his thoughts and actions had been "in the highest degree ridiculous, senseless, presumptuous, and criminal . . . criminal against God, my Emperor, criminal against Russia, my country, criminal against all laws, political and moral, divine and human."[3] Formerly, said Bakunin, he stifled the voice of conscience which warned him of the wickedness of his ways. But now "he can only be thankful that his arrest has been brought to an end," before more harm could be done by "my idle, useless, and criminal career." In his confession Bakunin had put himself completely at the mercy of the "wrathful and dread" Czar, admitting that he deserved the sternest penalty. It is of interest to note that Bakunin had also compared himself to a repentant son before an irate father: (". . . a prodigal, estranged and perverted son before an insulted and angry father.")

In a like manner, Leo Tolstoy, the apostle of the philosophy of non-resistance, in his confession humbly repents and tends to go to extremes in castigating himself for the sins of his youth:

> . . . I wished with all my heart to be good but I was young. I had passions . . . I cannot recall those years without dread, loathing, and anguish of heart. I killed people in war and challenged to duells to kill; I lost money at cards, wasting the labour of the peasants; I punished them, fornicated, and cheated. Lying, stealing, acts of lust of every description, drunkenness, violence, murder. There was not a crime which I did not commit . . . At that time I began to write through vanity, avarice, and pride. In my writings I did the same as in life. In order to have glory and money, for which I wrote, I had to conceal what was good and speak what was bad. And so I did.[4]

On the folk level the strength and prevalence of guilt feelings combined with a deeply rooted need and demand for forgiveness

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

783 [167] might be indicated in the farewell greeting phrase: *prashchaite* (forgive me). The same sentiment is manifested in readiness to shed tears at the slightest provocation. Easy and frequent weeping is found in all strata of Russian society, men and women alike. Autobiographies, belles-lettres as well as folk literature, give ample evidence for this phenomenon. Religious practices of the Russian Church support such needs and demand that repentance be manifested in frequent tears. There are even practical precepts in Russian Church literature about how to provoke tears:

> If you have no tears, do not despair; sigh frequently and heavily from all the heart; for tears are the gift of God, and by and by, with sighs and prayers you will obtain them from God. . . . Having found tears, preserve them with all your strength.[5]

II

It appears that this sense of guilt and passion for confession and self-incrimination, which are rooted in patriarchal family structure, might be strengthened and promoted by a social system in which one is utterly at the mercy of arbitrary superior forces that are not bound nor limited by any moral obligations or any superior principles of law or justice. If one has aroused the anger of such forces he may have a slight hope of forgiveness and salvation only if he completely gives up his individuality, renounces all struggle, and prostrates himself before the omnipotent powers, begging for pity and commiseration.

783 771 167 The annals of Russia's political, social and juridical history give much evidence of such feelings and attitudes. It is perhaps in the field of religion where such sense of utter helplessness before a fearful superior force is projected. There is a tendency in Russian religious beliefs to picture at the one end of the Universe a stern and implacable God and at the other end of it a helpless mankind which is at the complete mercy of this detached and fearful Ruler. But the orphans, the poor, the needy and the repentant, in other words those who are utterly helpless and dependent can expect compassion from Him.[6] Hence there is emphasis both on fear and humility in Russian Orthodoxy.

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

That image of God and attitudes toward him might be to a certain extent projections of social and political relations could be seen, for instance, in the *Hundred Chapters*, a practical code of several centuries of Russia's early Christian life. This code stresses the need for fear and awe of earthly powers as a way to train oneself in fear and awe of God. "A pupil fears the master's cudgel more than the master himself"; "After them (masters), bow your head with humility, before every rich man"; "Those who have received power and fortune from their Tsar require glory also from their friends and demand veneration from minors." "Bow your head to everybody senior to you . . . fear the prince with all your power . . . from him you will learn how to fear God. . . . Who does not fear the earthly lord, how will he fear Him whom he does not see." "With the fear of God, as with a bridle, restrain your mind, keeping a watch on yourself every hour."[7]

This tendency to project the fear of omnipotent earthly powers into the supernatural world persisted as long as the autocratic and despotic powers of the Father and of the Czar were perpetuated and as long as the Church identified itself with the state. Describing her confessor, a Russian princess said that: "His [the priest's] principles were exactly those of my uncle; he was an extreme monarchist representing God as absolute monarch of the universe, and identifying the ideas of religion with a kind of rigorous bureaucracy, controlling every detail of life."[8] The image of a demanding God giving nothing in return penetrated all the strata of Great-Russian society, the peasants and the merchants, as well as the nobility and the intelligentsia:

> *Nyanya* [nurse] was entrusted with my religious instruction . . . She thought God was just like the Czar, except that one lived in heaven and the other on earth. He was the most powerful of all beings and inclined to be stern rather than merciful. At any rate she always spoke of his severity and never of his goodness. "He'll teach you to behave yourself! He doesn't forgive people! He is pitiless when He is offended!" . . . The saints were of negligible importance in her eyes.[9]

Chaikovsky, the renowned Russian composer, had a similar idea of God as a fearful being: "I had toward Him (and even

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

[Ivan the Terrible]

[Dobrolyubov]

593 154 159 ment and indulgence to which Ivan was exposed as a child. Early in his life Ivan was left an orphan. His father died when he was four and he lost his mother four years later. As a child Ivan was reared among crouching servility as well as among arrogance, violence, and contempt. He was greatly pampered on the part of some of his tutors and courtiers, but also often deeply wounded on the part of others. Some of the boyars at the court would annoy him and insult him. They would arrest and threaten with death persons to whom Ivan was attached.

In his own writings, Ivan tells us how much he suffered because he was deprived of his attachments and frustrated in his expectations. It is possible, that it was as a result of such experiences that Ivan developed ideas of rejection, persecution and self-pity, as well as an urge for self-assertion by means of destructive aggression. He sought for himself power which was as overwhelming as that of omnipotent God and asserted himself by means of ruthless violence. "My parents never had a care for me," he claimed. He also said: "In vain I have looked for some man to have pity upon me, but have found no one. Yea, no comforter have I found, but only such as have rewarded me evil for good and hatred for love."[2] He felt emotionally very dependent upon his wife and blamed the courtiers for her early death. He himself explained his assassinations of the boyars on that ground. "Why divided ye me from my wife? Had ye not taken from me my *unitza* (heifer—young wife), never had there been the slayings of the boyars."[3] The old documents say about Ivan • [159] that "He pitieth not men, nor yet yieldeth. Likewise, he loveth not contrary speech, but doth conceive anger against them who do speak it."[4] He is described by his biographers as "self-seeking, opinionated, ferocious and self-willed."

More recent evidence of the effect of rejection-indulgence is given by Dobrolyubov, one of the outstanding Russian intellectual rebels of the second part of the nineteenth century. According to his biographers and according to his own diary, Dobrolyubov was thwarted in his attachment to his father, a clergyman, who was detached, harsh and even brutal in dealings with his son. Dobrolyubov was very close to his mother, but this relation apparently did not compensate for the thwarting and

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

[Belinsky]
[Nekrasov]
[Herzen]

538 517 was to convey to the masses a social message. In their literary essays they stressed the social and political ills of Russia and believed in the Westernization of their country as a way out of its social and political difficulties.

[593] 159 It is reported that Belinsky grew up with the feeling of revolt against the despotism of his father who tyrannized the family. [157] Nekrasov, "at the age of 17 . . . broke with his father whom he detested even as he idolized his mother" . . . And it was Nekrasov who in his writings showed an especially "great and unfeigned compassion for the poor and the suffering" and who "idealized and worshipped the Russian people,"[1] that is, the people who have been exposed to an age long misery. In a similar manner Herzen had generalized his childhood experiences and had transferred his reactions to all human kind. As a child he showed a strong reaction against his "inaccessible" father and a deep sympathy for all those whom his father abused:

> . . . the hushed voices and noiseless steps of the servants were no sign of devotion, but of repression and fear. All impulsiveness and frankness my father disliked and called familiarity; and all display of feeling passed with him for sentimentality. And when this proud old man, with his clear understanding and sincere contempt of mankind, played this part of a passionless judge, whom did he mean to impress by the performance: A woman whose will he had broken, though she never tried to oppose him; a boy whom his own treatment drove from mere naughtiness to positive disobedience; and a score of footmen whom he did not reckon as human beings! . . . Always on his guard, discontented with everyone, he suffered when he saw the feelings he inspired in every member of the household. Smiles died away and talk stopped whenever he came into the room. Stinging mockery and cool contemptuous irony were the weapons which he could wield with the skill of an artist, and he used them equally against us and against the servants. There are few things that a growing boy resents more; and, in fact, up to the time of my imprisonment I was on bad terms with my father and carried on a petty warfare against him, with the men and maids for my allies . . . did I deserve that he should preach even the truth in a manner so repulsive to the heart of youth? His intelligence, chilled by a long life spent in a corrupt society, made him suspicious of all the world; his feelings were not warm and did not crave for reconciliation; and therefore he remained at enmity

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RFl Great Russia RFl

wanted to suffer, wanted persecution."[18] A number of heroes in Dostoyevsky's novels show the same urge.

Undoubtedly such feelings contributed to that tone of fanaticism and that readiness for self-sacrifice which was characteristic of many Russian revolutionaries and conspirators of pre-Soviet days and which gave a special vigor and intensity to their activities. Such extremes in emotional reactions were supported also by another trait in these people, that of emotional instability.

13
EMOTIONAL INSTABILITY

I

FEAR and awe (*strakh*), submission (*povinovenie*), and sense of guilt (*sovest*) are rooted in the structure of the Great-Russian society and are supported by its traditions. But so is compassion (*zhalost*), humility (*smirenie*), demand for truth and justice (*pravda*) and for egalitarian acceptance, as well as revolt and terror (*ustrashenie*), lack of trust and urge to destroy (*unichtozhenie*). It is the propensity to experience such contrasting sentiments that causes behavior which is alternatively bent in opposite directions. A person's behavior which has been conditioned by an environment which fosters such feelings and attitudes might show a lack of sense of moderation and a tendency toward extremes in responses to his social milieu.

It is such unbalanced peculiarities of behavior that have drawn the attention of many students and observers of Russian society.[1] A tendency toward diametrically opposite extremes, and frequent alternation between these poles has been often noticed. Kindliness and gentleness have alternated with lack of consideration, excessive severity, brutality and cruelty. Rebelliousness has been followed by resignation. Periods of feverish energy and confidence have been superseded by spells of inertia, languor and despair. Extremes in feasting have alternated with extremes in fasting. Tyrannical rule had its counterpart in demands for

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

absolute and unconditional liberty and denial of any laws, conventions or obligations.[2] Ideologies which sought universal salvation and identification with Christ's teaching (Dissent, Slavophilism) had their counterparts in the ideologies which demanded universal destruction and identification with anti-Christ (Nihilism, Terrorism).[3]

Among the intelligentsia a lack of a sense for methodical work, and lack of initiative were combined with preoccupation concerning grandiose and utopian plans on a world scale. There was a noticeable lack of preparation for these programs and a tendency to consider that having made plans was equal to their fulfillment. Such traits were so striking among some intelligentsia that they were given a special name (*Oblomovshtina*).[4]

It is known that a number of outstanding Russian intellectuals have shown a remarkable lack of emotional balance in their behavior. These would often move from one ideological camp into that of their bitter opponents. In ideological controversies no tolerance was shown for the opposite point of view. There was a tendency to treat all in the opposite camp as enemies. "Who is not with us is against us," was the principle applied in theory and practice. Some outstanding Russian intellectuals themselves admitted such traits in their character. Dostoyevsky, for instance, analyzing his own feelings stated: "In all things I go to the uttermost extremes; my life long I have never been acquainted with moderation." Not unlike this self-analysis of Dostoyevsky was that of Bakunin. In his "Confession to the Czar" he said: "There was in my character a radical defect: love for the fantastic, for out-of-the-way, unheard of adventures, for undertakings which open up an infinite horizon and whose end no man can foresee."[5]

According to General Golovine among the army officers there was a "tendency to drunkenness, churlishness and tyranny toward their subordinates," but there were also "many heroes among these negative types," and often a "regular officer showed such readiness to sacrifice himself that his superiors were forced to restrain his excessive ardor."[6] Lack of balance and stability was also reflected in the differences between military units. Often "next to a first class regiment there was another completely worthless."[7]

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RFI Great Russia RFI

Top ruling circles themselves often exhibited a great lack of self-control. A number of rulers showed a tendency toward excesses and extremes that bordered on insanity. Even the Czars of the nineteenth century, in spite of many Western moderating influences, showed tendencies toward instability and extremes in their behavior. Not seldom a new monarch would completely reverse the policies of his predecessor. The rulers tended to show great instability also in attitudes toward their advisers. They would turn suddenly against the old councilors and find new favorites. As a result often "the mighty of yesterday were sent to Siberia or the scaffold." But also barrack and bedchamber revolutions were frequent, reflecting the suddenly changing extremes in moods within the ruling cliques.

Lack of moderation and emotional instability was one of the favored themes of Russian belles-lettres of the nineteenth century. The heroes in these works often display an extremely unbalanced type of behavior. Feodor Chaliapin, who himself took part in producing such types on the Russian stage, states the following:

. . . When I think of the characters I have created on the Russian stage, I am conscious not so much of the characters themselves as of an all pervading sense of the Russian temperament that is all extremes. . . . It seems as though Russian temperament is entirely devoid of moderation. . . . The fact remains that their contradictions are far more harsh and violent than those of most mentalities. . . . The Russian heart is infinitely pitiful and tender, but at the same time what gross and often completely aimless cruelty and tyranny are to be found in Russian life. The Russian soul is extraodinarily sensitized, but what brutality and lustful suspicion and vulgarism are to be found in human relationships. It is only too true that neither in good nor in evil can the Russian steer a middle course . . .[8]

In *Khovantchina* it is religious fanaticism, and how profound and powerful is that fanaticism! A normal mind could not possibly comprehend that perfect serenity which enables men to die for their belief. They stand on the sheer rampart, utterly oblivious of the stairway by which they might descend to safety. They batter their heads against the wall, unconscious of pain . . . In Rimsky-Korsakov's *Pskovitane* I take the part of Ivan the Terrible. He, the Tsar, cares nothing that the river runs red with blood, so illimitable is his knowledge of

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

his power over others, so unshakable is his belief in his own sovereignty. . . . There is tremendous strength in *Boris Godunov,* the part I would sooner play than any of the others of my repertory. Here again the Russian temperament is overwhelmingly manifest in the seditious license of the boyars, as it is in the boundless autocracy of Ivan the Terrible. It appears also in the lawlessness and drunkenness of Prince Galitski, one of the chief characters of Borodin's admirable opera *Prince Igor.* Galitski's excesses are as extreme as his cynicism.[9]

Some observers of Great-Russian music find in it traits similar to those of Great-Russian belles-lettres. According to Leroy-Beaulieu the Great-Russian music shows an "alternation between extreme emotionality and extreme peacefulness."[10] And according to General Golovine this music is a "combination of the vague and salient softness and harshness of sound, deep sorrow and uncontrolled gaiety, dreams and drama, restlessness and calm . . ."[11] Golovine specifically referred to the music of Glinka, Chaikovsky, Borodin, Rimsky-Korsakoff, and Rachmaninoff.

Extremes of self-aggrandizement followed by self-maceration, murder followed by tears, is noticeable also in the Russian folk psychology. The Great-Russian folk songs, for instance, are often full of cruelty, but are also heart-breaking and plaintive, full of sadness, melancholy and tragedy, sung in minor key. In folk tales and folk songs about Stenka Razin, this robber-bandit is represented both as magnanimous and cruel, as savage and pitiful. He revolted against those in authority, but rallied the poor and rebellious beneath his banner. At the same time he himself showed traits of barbarism and of self-laceration. One of the popular Russian folk songs, tells us, for instance, how once Stenka, "drunk with wine and mirth together," lifted the Persian Princess, his beloved "new-vow bride," over the side of his barque and flung her "forth into the hungry deep" of the Volga, as "a gift from a Cossack of the Don." Stenka acted in such a violent manner because some of his comrades had scornfully reproached him that in his affection to his bride he behaved like a *baba* (woman).

II

A number of interpretations are offered for such behavior.[12] Most of these explanations are either "geografic" or "cultural-

6: Tomatic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

that "If all laws perished the people would live in truth and justice."[7]

The peasant realized that there was sharp differentiation in economic status in his society as well as in his own local community. But what he especially resented was that the men of wealth took advantage of their position to oppress the weak; and that the poor had to be utterly submissive and subservient to the well-to-do. "The one who is better off has long hands," the peasants would say, meaning that the men of wealth had control over others. And he would compare the arbitrariness of the man of power with the craftsman who handles his material according to his will. "The master is like the carpenter: he cuts the way it pleases him." He would also say that the rich man has all the space he wants "as much as the pike in the water," but as "for the poor there is nowhere any room." He resented the fact that though "Poverty was not sin, yet the people laughed at it." He also objected that the poor were forced to repress their real feelings and cringe before the rich. "The poor are angry at the rich, yet they find themselves in their trail with cap in hand," he would complain.[8]

The peasant therefore grew distrustful and resentful of everyone who was in one way or other above him. He could not depend much upon God and Czar, and he mistrusted the bureaucrats, the landlords, the priests, the judges, the police, and even the better-off people of his own strata. He was particularly distrustful of cities and city folk, of Moscow and Moscovites especially. From ancient times he looked upon Moscow, the seat of the Czar's government, as heartless and deceitful, and as the source of most of his troubles. "In Moscow," he thought, "you find everything except own father and mother." He also considered that his capital city was so corrupted that, "If you go to Moscow you must take there your last penny."

The peasant therefore lived in an environment in which he felt deserted by the powers of heaven and oppressed by their representatives on earth. He therefore felt unprotected, isolated, friendless, lonely, and insecure. His idea was that both God and man were against him. "If God attacks you, good people will attack you too," he would complain.

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

corresponding Party structure on the lower levels of the Party hierarchy where Party Secretariats hold the reins of power. In this system of political and social control it is the Party Secretariats on local, regional and republic levels that are of pivotal importance.[2] Through his control of the Central Party Secretariat, the supreme Party leader is enabled to select the most useful and the most trusted people for such offices.[3]

The top Party leadership is therefore in a position to direct the recruitment of Party membership. It is empowered to accept and to expel members. It directs the secretariats on the lower levels of Party hierarchy as to whom the Party shall "elect" as its officers and as its deputies to the higher Party bodies, or whom to delegate to the local or national Soviets, and other representative Party or non-Party institutions. It consults with the secretariats about the appointment of trusted Party members to responsible regional and republic government and managerial positions, and it checks on fulfillment of Party directives. This checking is done through the Committee of Party Control whose representatives function independently of local Party bodies.[4]

Stalin was well aware of the significance of the selection of leading Party personnel from the point of view of perpetuation of power when he said "Cadres decide everything." It was by his control of the top Party Secretariat that he himself was enabled to eliminate all his opponents in the hierarchy and to rise to undisputed and absolute leadership.

Since it is local, regional and republic Party secretaries who form the axis of this monolithic Party-state machine, the position of such potentates yields great power, and high material rewards. Such offices are therefore sought after by people of great ambition and lust for power, also by people of fighting, conspiratorial and domineering inclinations. Thus it is the zealous, the shrewd, the calculating and the career-minded people who are also efficient and hard-driving that tend to be picked out for these positions because it is such people on whom the Party can rely for a blind and unquestioning execution of all orders. The Party which has remained essentially a conspiratorial organization demands militancy and aggressiveness, a severe and exacting attitude toward subordinates, irreconcilability and lack of com-

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

665
555
●157

passion towards deviants and slackers, lack of intimacy among associates, complete dedication, and humbleness concerning one's own achievements.

Since the Party membership must assist the Party secretaries in the execution of Party policies, it is from among the same types of people that a significant part of the Party membership tends to be recruited. Such people form the hard core of the Party cells and the *aktivs* of Party and government institutions. They are likely to be distant and stern, critical and demanding; they watch over and feel responsible for the behaviour of others, but show no personal consideration or concern.[5]

Another part of Party membership is recruited from among the people who are not zealous, nor over-ambitious nor blindly submissive, but are especially useful to the Party because of their occupational or professional skills. Such people are likely to be competent, as well as humane, considerate, close to their subordinates and understanding in their relations with non-Party men. These people tend to alleviate the harshness of Soviet oppressive bureaucracy and perform therefore a function which is analogous to the role of the mother in the patriarchal Russian family.

It is however the hard core of zealots and careerists who are on the ascendancy and who direct Party work and control government administration and economic management with the help of the aktivs, that is, groups of selected and trusted persons formed within every organization to assist its leadership according to the Party directives. Aktiv is a cardinal agency of Party control. It is an institution of vigilance, supervision and intelligence, as well as an instrument of guidance and planned political manipulation. In the Party itself the role of the aktivs is of fundamental importance:

> Meetings of Party *aktiv* members play an outstanding role in the life of the Party organizations. It is at these meetings that the decisions of the Party and government as well as major problems in the life and work of the Party are discussed. The meetings of Party activists are a means of expression of Party public opinion; they are a forum for Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism.[6]

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

group which claims perfection and monopoly on Truth cannot afford to lay itself open to any fundamental criticism of its accomplishments. Figures are therefore manipulated so as to achieve the desired effect.[22] "In the land of the Soviets statistics have become a weapon for Socialism and Communism," the Bolsheviks say.

II

Shaping of the "new man" must begin early in his childhood. To answer to this need, the schools have become in the Soviet system one of the fundamental instruments of character molding in the hands of the ruling faction. Special measures must be applied by educators to fashion character since "the life itself would not do it," the Bolsheviks say. The schools in the Soviet society have therefore a twofold objective. The first is to develop in each and every child psychological traits which are considered most desirable from the point of view of the perpetuation of the Soviet system and Bolshevik rule. The other is to develop needed skills and to train specialists which are of fundamental importance in a system of total control, such as experts in conspiracy, political organization and agitation, in overseeing, in vigilance and violence.

In a thoroughly regimented society training in unconditional obedience and in identification with and dependence upon the leader is of paramount importance. Such personality traits, already rooted in the Russian social and political structure, are being reinforced by the system of training in the Soviet schools whose pedagogical principles in their essentials do not differ from the precepts of the Domostroy. "From early years we must educate children so that a state of discipline will remain as their permanent possession," says a textbook on Soviet pedagogy.[23] "This discipline must be *firm*, that is, unquestioned obedience and submission to the leader, the teacher, or the organizer . . . " Submission to the will of the leader "is a necessary and essential mark of discipline."[24]

According to these pedagogical ideas the teacher does not coax pupils, he *demands* obedience.[25] The teacher is expected to be "authoritative and strict." Whenever necessary he must give

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

876 157 commands and impose punishments. "If an order is given it must be carried out absolutely."[26] In order to achieve such absolute, unconditional and unquestioning obedience, the training of the young must be not only strict and firm but also consistent, so that their "habit of obedience" once formed is not easily broken.[27] Training in blind obedience is justified by the need to avoid conflicts and discord which a Soviet society cannot tolerate.[28] In such a society all available human energy must be employed exclusively in building socialism.

In order to develop the habit of unconditional obedience it is necessary to prevent any reflection upon given orders. Therefore the school training must stamp out "indecision" in the Soviet children. "We must create in Soviet children a state of mind which causes them to consider indecision in necessary actions as unworthy of their honor."[29] Obedience and submission demand traits of self-abnegation and self-denial; " . . . to bear pain patiently, to maintain self-control on hearing unpleasant news, and to endure unavoidable privations without complaint . . . all of this means to children a manifestation of courage."[30]

It is recognized that children have to be trained also in leadership, and that initiative is necessary in that respect. The Party, however, cannot allow any such initiative which might go counter to the Party's will. It is emphasized therefore that the initiative, too, must be "disciplined," because it is needed only for purposes of organization, vigilance and struggle along the lines put forward by those who possess the Truth. Hence according to Soviet principles of education it is "important that initiative not be exhibited impulsively, but that it be directed into organized channels . . . out of children of initiative good organizers must come."[31]

876 156 This complete submerging of the individual into his group, rooted in the social and political traditions of Russian society, is being reinforced by Soviet school training which strives to "educate people for whom the pronoun *I* could not . . . become more important than *we*, for whom thought for themselves always yields to thought for their comrades, for the group and for the country."[32] In this manner "clash between social demands and personal inclinations" is surmounted and the group

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RFI Great Russia RFI

is "perfected until there are no shortcomings." Then on members of such a group one can make great demands.[33] They will be disciplined, enduring, courageous and faithful. Work will become "second nature" to them; they will not abhor hard effort, nor be afraid of "healthy sweat."[34] They will be industrious and efficient and will develop the "best and most worthy feelings of man," that is, devotion to labor, heroism in the struggle against the forces of reaction, untiring, ruthless and unwavering vigilance against the survivals of capitalism, and an irreconcilable attitude toward the slightest manifestations of deviationism.[35]

III

In the days of Czardom the system of economic and political regimentation found its support in religious sanction and in nationalism. In a like manner the Bolsheviks had early realized that great privations which their regime demands could be best elicited from their subjects with the help of an identification with the great, the absolute, the sublime. It is by such means that traditional cravings for attachment and acceptance could be satisfied. In such a manner also a sense of guilt and urge for self-sacrifice could be reinforced and employed for political purposes.

It is along such efforts that the Bolsheviks have revived and strengthened the traditional Russian images of God, Czar, Father and Mother and have projected these images to the Leader and to the Party. The likeness to God and religion is manifested in the Bolshevik claim of infallibility of their leaders, universality, eternity, and sanctity of their doctrines. Lenin's teachings, for instance, are extolled by the Bolsheviks as being "superior" to any other ideology, as embracing the whole of humanity, and as living forever:

> Lenin's thoughts represent a superior achievement of the Russian and of the world culture; an eternally living and eternally developing science of society—a fighting banner of the working class—living soul of the Bolshevik Party which led our Fatherland to the avant-garde of the whole human kind.
>
> The books of the vozhd and teacher are immortal. They live and

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

members was close to 85 percent. And as to the top level of the army command by 1941 this top military hierarchy was one hundred percent Communist.[66]

To maintain ideological purity among the armed forces and to strengthen the Party's control is the specific function of the political officer and of the Partorg (Party organizer). The political officers have now regular army training and in the actual fighting, the political officer becomes "the commander's substitute or takes his place when the commander is disabled."[67] It is this ability of the Party to replace any army commander by an army trained but Party devoted man, that is expected to insure absolute control of the armed forces by the Party even in times of greatest stress and defeat. The duty of the political officers is not only to interpret and to propagandize the latest utterances of the Party leaders or the decisions of the Politburo, but to watch for any weakening of enthusiasm, for any pessimism or gloomy views that may be noticed and to combat vigorously any signs of demoralization. The most important task of the political officers, however, is to cultivate martial spirit and to build up morale, thus creating "a psychological condition which sets up resistance to fear of discomfort, pain, or death."[68]

The goal of the Party is to infiltrate with martial spirit not the armed forces alone, but the whole Soviet population as a means of bolstering the morale of the Soviet masses behind the Bolshevik regime. This is being achieved by means of militarization of all public activities. The Bolshevik leaders consider that militarization is the only morale builder in a situation in which the laboring masses tend to become lethargic, apathetic and disinterested in their work. Speaking of the experiences in World War II, Stalin said that in that struggle people got transformed and acquired new qualities which strengthened the power of the Bolsheviks: "But the people themselves in the rear have been transformed, they have been more efficient, less slipshod, more disciplined; they have learned to work in wartime fashion, and to realize their duty to our motherland."[69] Stalin looks at sports and athletics from the same point of view:

We stood for five hours on the tomb while the show went on. The Generalissimo showed no sign of fatigue. On the contrary, he ap-

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RFI Great Russia RFI

peared to enjoy every minute of the show . . . A final remark of the Generalissimo's while we were watching the sports spectacle was that mass athletics and exercises were fine because of their effect upon the populace. He said, "This develops the war spirit."[70]

In accordance with the Bolshevik need for morale building most Soviet institutions have been militarized, including the Party. Thus when a Soviet subject leaves his school and his Pioneer or Komsomol organization and enters a factory, a kolhoz, an office, a research laboratory, or becomes a Party worker, he has been already trained for work in a society which is in most of its aspects organized along military lines. Anywhere where he is assigned a job he might find military discipline and military relationships. In a number of civilian jobs he will wear a uniform with badges of his rank. In his factory or kolhoz he may become a member of a "shock brigade" or a "hero of labor" and therefore an important link in an all-embracing Five-Year-Plan whose main emphasis is on military preparedness. As a Party member he will take his position in the Party pyramid as a common soldier, as a petty officer, or as a higher officer:

> Three or four thousand men of the high command—the generals of our Party. Then 30 to 40 thousand intermediate commanders; these constitute the officers' corps of our Party. And further, 100 to 180 thousand of the leading elements of our party—these are, so to speak —the subaltern officers of the Party.[71]

In a militarized society military language is used in all activities. Military language has always been a tradition in the Bolshevik Party and has been always widely employed by Lenin, Stalin, and other Party leaders. Therefore when addressing a meeting, or when writing in a newspaper or in a literary or scholarly periodical a Soviet subject is expected to employ military phrases, and use analogies taken from military campaigns and military experiences. He will speak of "reconnoissance," "skirmishes," "encounters," "operations," "outposts," "fortresses," "citadels," "maneuvres," "camps," "cadres," etc. and he will be expected to do his duty on his own "battle post." If he rises to the top of the Party hierarchy and if he especially distinguishes himself in his civil activities he might be endowed

6; Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RFI Great Russia RFI

in that family, the new circumstances call for more leniency and more intimacy on his part toward his wife and his children. The mother at the same time, because now closer to her husband, is in no need to become over-attached to her children. Such well-balanced family relations come to closely resemble those in the Old-Slavonic family.

It is the children with such close family ties in an emotionally balanced family atmosphere that develop traits of moderation, self-control, responsibility, group orientation and humane feelings. It is in such families that patriotism, idealization of the past and longing for a more humane and more equalitarian political system are nursed.[28] In such families skepticism concerning Bolshevik mythology and opposition to Soviet system may be safely expressed. In such families also religion is cultivated or secretly practiced.[29] In such families apparently numerous anecdotes which ridicule Soviet regime circulate and are spread throughout the Soviet Union.[30] It is to break such family intimacy and solidarity which breed opposition to their regime that the Bolsheviks have shown increasing concern for the control of family relations.

But if the opposition to the Bolshevik regime centers in such families of patriots and humanists, the fate of the Soviet system might rest upon them, in the final analysis. These people might be reluctant to support a Soviet war of aggression led by careerists and fanatics, but ready to defend their Mother Country in the event of hostile aggression from the outside. However, in a war against the Soviet Union which the patriots and the humanists would interpret as a war of liberation from the oppressive, inhuman and destructive policies of Soviet rulers, they might be inclined to take the side of the invading liberators. Inasmuch as such people already find themselves at the fringes of Soviet power structure as specialists and experts in economic management and government administration, in times of crisis the shift of power to these people could easily take place.

Such a trend of development will be even more emphasized among the oppressed, but nationally-conscious minorities, than among the dominant Great-Russians. Millions of Soviet subjects who willingly gave themselves up to the German invaders and

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

establish the strictest military discipline within its own ranks. The experience of the Russian Communist Party . . . has proved that the victory of the worker is impossible without a severe discipline . . . and unconditional subordination of subordinate units to the decision of those above them, and a strong Party central organ, whose decrees are binding upon all the leaders of Party life . . .[36]

In this manner, the principles of absolute dominance, unconditional obedience and ruthless discipline rooted in the political traditions of Russian society and reinforced by the structure of Bolshevik power were extended to all the parties on which the Bolsheviks imposed their control. In the same manner, also. the traditional filial attitudes of reverence, gratitude, love and humility have been established in relations of these parties to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Accordingly also, destructive aggression became one of the fundamental orientations of these parties. The Communist parties have been encouraged to use all means at their disposal, "including force of arms" in order "to overthrow the international bourgeoisie,"[37] and to "lay low the exploiters . . . completely defeat them . . . crush their resistance. . . ."[38]

As a result, the language of these parties, like that of Bolshevism, stresses hatred, destruction and war. For instance, in the Theses and Statutes and in the Program the emphasis is on extreme hostility expressed in many stereotyped phrases, such as "hatred and relentless aggression," "pitiless struggle," "persistent and merciless denunciation," "merciless contempt," "stubborn, armed and ruthless fight," "fierce and decisive battles," "ruthless war." These means against the "mortal enemy" are said to be necessary in order "to destroy the apparatus of the bourgeoisie," and to bring about the "violent overthrow" of bourgeois power, "at whatever cost." Each Communist party is expected to foster hatred and destructive aggression by all means of propaganda and agitation. The Communist press in all countries and popular Communist songs are especially significant in this respect.

Since the Communist parties outside the Soviet Union, just as the Bolshevik Party itself, stress hatred, pitilessness and destruction, they tend to attract into their ranks people who for one

6; Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

reason or another feel rejected, non-accepted, humiliated, oppressed or ostracized in their own society and who find in these parties an opportunity to vent their accumulated grievances and pent-up hostilities. But they also tend to attract people who for idealistic and humanistic reasons seek Utopias of all-human brotherhood. They attract ambitious and talented intellectuals and semi-educated people who have been thwarted in their professional and political expectations; also intellectuals and semi-intelligentsia with mediocre abilities but strong urges for self-assertion and desire for leadership and domination. They also attract many patriots belonging to oppressed nationalities or races, who have identified themselves with their nation, race or ethnic and cultural minority and seek acceptance of their group in a Communistic millenium. In times of social upheavals these parties attract also many adventurers, criminals, vagabonds, and other deviants and offenders.

It is, however, people overcharged with destructive aggression who in these parties tend to climb toward the top levels of Party leadership, because it is such people to whom the Party offers great opportunities for their destructive urges and who therefore tend to be unconditionally loyal to Moscow as contrasted to the more moderate and more humane and patriotic elements, who for one reason or another might not want always to accept Moscow's dictate. As a result of such internal conditions the history of all Communist parties has been a history of internal intrigues, splits, purges, and frequent bloodshed which in turn made it easier to completely subdue these organizations to the will of the Kremlin:

> . . . those who disorganize the Party are to be flayed without mercy. Championing as we do working class unity, we shall with so much more energy and irreconcilability fight for unity within our Parties. There can be no room in our Parties for factions, or for attempts at factionalism. Whoever will try to break up the iron unity of our ranks by any kind of factionalism will get to feel what is meant by the Bolshevik discipline that Lenin and Stalin have always taught us (applause) . . . *The Party is above everything else!* (Loud applause) To guard the Bolshevik unity of the Party as the apple of one's eye is the first and highest law of Bolshevism![20]